An Explanation of Transcendental
and Hermeneutic Phenomenology: Differences in Procedures and Similarities in
Descriptions
Phenomenology is a type of human
sciences research, and it deploys qualitative procedures to reveal the lived
experiences of small groups of individuals that are alike in some
characteristic. That is, phenomenological inquiry asks “what is the nature of
this lived experience” (Van Manen, 1990, p. 42). Thus, phenomenological inquiry
seeks to understand what an experience is like (Laverty, 2003; Van Manen, 1990)
through the use of open ended questions and “reading between lines” (Laverty,
2003; McConnell-Henry, Chapman, & Francis, 2009). Thus, a researcher may
come to understand in detail why a participant or group is particularly
stressed (Hein & Austin, 2001), as opposed to merely more generally
ascertaining that they are stressed or that their stress is associated with
some general factor, as in quantitative research.
The history of phenomenology dates
back to Kant and Hegel (Moustakas, 1994). Particularly though, Husserl and
Heidegger’s contributions would lead to two major camps in phenomenological
inquiry. Indeed, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology would precede
Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology, but both approaches are widely used
today (McConnell-Henry et al., 2009; Mottern, Davis, & Ziegler, 2013;
Moustakas, 1994, Van Manen, 1990). This paper addresses differences in
transcendental phenomenology and hermeneutic phenomenology and their associated
procedures. Additionally, this paper discusses plausible irrelevance in
difference between the findings of both associated procedures.
Philosophical
Underpinnings: Transcendental Phenomenology
As noted previously, transcendental
phenomenology is associated with the work of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). That
is, as Husserl hailed from a mathematical background, his approach to
phenomenological inquiry was grounded in positivism (Laverty, 2003;
McConnell-Henry et al., 2009; Moustakas, 1994). As such, he believed
phenomenological inquiry led to the capture of the one correct essence of
experience or absolute truth of an individual’s lived experience
(McConnell-Henry et al., 2009; Moustakas, 1994). In theory this is achieved by
the researcher employing a course of phenomenological reduction, known
otherwise as the concept of Epoche (Moustakas, 1994). That is, the researcher
brackets out his or her presuppositions prior to working with participants. Furthermore,
the aim of transcendental phenomenology, ideally, is to yield an unbiased description
of the participant’s lived experience. That is, “Husserl feared that an attempt
to interpret the participant’s contribution, by using for-structure as the
basis of interpretation, might lead to misunderstanding of essence of the
experience” (McConnell-Henry et al., 2009). Therefore, as Husserl believed,
interpretation would corrupt the essence of experience derived from interviews
with participants.
Philosophical
Underpinnings: Hermeneutic Phenomenology
While Husserl upheld bracketing as
an essential step in phenomenological inquiry, Heidegger believed it was impossibility
(Laverty, 2003; McConnell et al., 2009). That is, as Laverty (2003) stated of
Heidegger’s belief, “nothing can be encountered without reference to a person’s
background understanding” (p. 8). Thus, any writing about an encounter is
actually a form of interpretation, as is also the telling of the participant. Objectivity
cannot be achieved, though hermeneutic phenomenology strives for transparency
(McConnell et al, 2009; Mottern et al., 2013).
Transcendental
Phenomenological Method
According to McConnell et al.
(2009), “neither Husserl nor Heidegger aimed to produce methodologies” (p. 8).
However, others later developed methods out of Husserl and Heidegger’s
philosophical beliefs, and Moustakas (1994) outlined two methods of analysis
for transcendental phenomenology. Moustakas (1994) outlined his modification on
the Van Kaam method to include:
1.
List
all relevant statements.
2.
Eliminate
redundant statements or those that are otherwise unnecessary for understanding.
3.
Cluster
remaining statements into themes.
4.
Double
check those statements and themes against the transcript to ensure statements
and themes are compatible the original meaning in the transcript.
5.
Construct
a textual description for each participant. That is, construct the “how” of the
experience (Strunk, Pickler, & Myers, 2014).
6.
Construct
a structural description for each participant to relay how the phenomenon was
experienced (Struck et al., 2014).
7.
Construct
a Textual-Structural Description for each participant.
8.
“Develop
a Composite Description of the meanings and essences of the experience”
(Moustakas, 1994, p. 121).
Similarly,
Strunk et al. (2014) and Moerer-Urdahl and Creswell (2004) employed this
procedure in their research. However, both studies did not mention including
step four and step seven.
Moustakas also outlined his
modification of the Stevick-Colaizzi-Keen method. While similar to the Van Kaam
modification, this method heavily incorporates the experience of the
researcher, the researcher being among the participants. Yet, as the Van Kaam
modification is transdendental, it is assumed bracketing precedes the outline. What
is more, descriptions of bracketing portray it as far less intensive than
formally incorporating the researcher into the study (Moerer-Urdahl &
Crewswell, 2004; Strunk et al., 2014). Additionally, transcendental approaches
have included expert reviewers for “intersubjective agreement,” as well as
validation from participants (Laverty, 2003).
Hermeneutic
Phenomenological Method
Unlike transcendental phenomenology,
hermeneutic phenomenological methods appear to possess much less structure. However,
they include co-constructing meaning with participants, ongoing self-reflection
(Laverty, 2003; Mottern et al., 2013), and striving for transparency (Mottern
et al., 2013). They also rely heavily on thematic analysis (Mottern et al.,
2013; Van Manen, 1990). In fact Van Manen (1990) outlined three general approaches
to thematic analysis, and Mottern et al. (2013) provided a model that revolved
around three essential steps: “(a) conducting and transcribing interviews, (b)
analyzing data for thematic units, and (c) developing a thematic structure” (p.
323). Finally, hermeneutic phenomenology may also include bracketing, which
aids transparency (Mottern et al., 2013).
Choosing an
Methodological Approach
According to Osborne (1994),
methodology should be chosen based upon the philosophical beliefs of the
researcher. Interestingly, however, Hein and Austin (2001) found little
difference between descriptions of a participant rendered by transcendental and
hermeneutic methods. That is, Hein and Austin (2001) deployed a transcendental
phenomenologist and hermeneutic phenomenologist to study the same individual,
and both provided very similar descriptions of the participant’s experience.
Furthermore, Hein and Austin (2001) described both transcendental phenomenology
and hermeneutic phenomenology as interpretive. After all, the methods
themselves are inherently interpretations (McConnell et al., 2009). That is, if
bracketing is impossible, as Heidegger believed (Laverty, 2001), then the work
of transcendental phenomenologists is also subjective. Therefore, one might conclude
form of analysis as merely a matter of personal preference.
Conclusion
There are two camps of
phenomenological inquiry, one that assumes the reduction of subjectivity is
possible (transcendental) and one that asserts bracketing is impossible
(hermeneutic). Also, while procedures for conducting transcendental
phenomenological analysis are rather detailed, procedures for conducting hermeneutic
phenomenological analysis are less defined. Interestingly, however, there appears
to be little difference in the descriptions of experience rendered by both
procedures, perhaps supporting Heidegger’s disbelief in Husserl’s claim that
one could bracket or set aside one’s subjectivity in conducting research.
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