According to Madison (2005),
Heidegger disagreed with Husserl. That
is, while Husserl encouraged bracketing, Heidegger thought it was impossible or
that “there is never a “pure” interpretation,” and I agree with this. Actually, I think the concept of bracketing
might undermine the legitimacy of phenomenology in the first place. Phenomenology is concerned with the study of
the subjective. Consciousness builds
schema upon schema or noetic factors and noemic meanings on top of each other. There is no wiping subjectivity from the mind.
Yet, considering my issues with
Husserl I am now unsure about my next course of action. What would Heidegger do? Would he just follow the methods outlined in
Moustakas (1994) less any bracketing?
Recently, I was encouraged to obtain a copy of Van Manen’s phenomenology
book, and I am hoping it will help.
Tonight I also looked over some
material on visual ethnography (Pink, 2013).
While I cannot say I have visual ethnography “on the brain” or that I
would make it central to my own work, I do not really see anything wrong with
it. Sure, there will be accusations of
subjectivity, but I don’t think there is any method that can eliminate
subjectivity. Methods and
interpretations are all constructs of the human mind, and they“help to produce
the reality that they understand” (Law, 2004, p.5).
Law, J. (2004). After method: Mess in
social science research. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.
Madison, S. D. (2005). Critical ethnography: Method, ethics, and performance. Thousand Oaks, Sage.
Moustakas, C. (1994).
Phenomenological research methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
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