Transdendental Phenomenology and Blast from the Past: The Structuralist and PostStructuralist Nebulous

Transcendental Phenomenology 

 I am beginning to see “light at the end of the tunnel” this semester. That is, I have a better conception of what I’m doing. I plan to begin researching articles and putting their details into a literature review matrix this weekend.

Also, I feel more drawn to transcendental phenomenology than hermeneutic phenomenology at this point.  I suppose having first read Moustakas (1994) and then having read Moerer-Urhahl and Creswell (2004) has had some bearing on this.  In particular Moustakas outlines steps that Moerer-Urhahl and Creswell refer to as “ideal for assisting less experienced researchers” (p. 21), and I indeed find the guide helpful. Or perhaps my background in psychology, particularly clinical psychology at the graduate level has had a bearing on this preference I find myself articulating. That is, according to Moerer-Urhahl and Crewswell, “hermeneutics requires reflective interpretation of a text or a study in history to achieve a meaningful understanding” (p. 20), but transcendental phenomenology aims to capture and relay “the essences of human experience” (p. 20). I think while these are very similar aims, transcendental phenomenology’s aim is deeper. Yet, I would understand a claim that transcendental phenomenology is further distorted by an additional layer of the researcher’s subjectivity.

While reading Moerer-Urhahl and Creswell (2004), I was pleased to see their study followed Moustakas’ modification to the Van Kaam method of analysis, so I did not have scratch my head too much. Also, I noted the authors’ discussion on epoche or bracketing out the researchers’ prejudgments.  While I suppose this step might help in eliminating a layer of the onion of subjectivity in making the reseachers’ aware and the readers aware of the researchers’ bias, I still don’t think it makes much of a difference.  Even the way we think – the way we perceive – it’s all subjective.

Structuralism and Poststructualism 

 As for structuralism and poststructuralism, I feel like my understanding is spotty.  That is I recognize the related chapter in Grbich (2013) condenses material that was the crux of my philosophy course, but some of it remains an enigma.  While reading Discipline and Punish (1977) exactly two years ago, I did understand basic arguments, such as the work of power in establishing norms to include standardized tests and levels of surveillance. As such, those in authority are the ones who name the signified, recognizing it as worthy of recognition in some way – providing it with a signifier – incorporating it into discourse.  Therefore, the role of the structuralist (like Foucault) “is to reconstruct an “object” in such a way as to manifest thereby the rules of functioning (the “functions”) of this object” (Grbich, p. 169).  In other words, Foucault studied the historical shaping of discourse.  Also, as far as I can tell, Derrida supported these suppositions in suggesting signifiers vary and change (Grbich).

Assuming I understand what I believe I do, I readily acknowledge I still have trouble grasping semiotics.  For instance, I’m not sure I’m convinced that “without language we cannot perceive the difference between others and ourselves” (Grbich, p. 171).

As for Deleuze and Guattari, I understand the “body without organs” as the reflective individual capable of exercising agency or moving against power or territorialisation.  This reflective individual recognizes ideas and belief systems for what they are and exercises agency in forming individual beliefs (deterritorialisation) (Grbich). I am curious about Deleuze and Guitarri’s critique of Marx, however.  I also read Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus two years ago.  But while some of this sounds familiar, I just don’t recall enough.  I know I did not understand it all either.

Finally, where post structuralism is concerned, I’m not detecting a line of demarcation between it and structuralism.

Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. (2009). Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and schizophrenia. NY: Penguin.

Foucault, M. (1995). Discipline & punish: The birth of the prison. (2^nd ed.). NY: Vintage.

Grbich, C. (2013). Qualitative data analysis: An introduction (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Moerer-Urdahl, T. & Creswell, J. W. (2004). Using transcendental phenomenology to explore the “Ripple Effect” in a leadership mentoring program. International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 3(2), 19-35.

Moustakas, C. (1994). Phenomenological research methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

My Contention with Husserl

Over the past couple of nights I have read through Moustakas’s (1994) chapter on transcendental phenomenology.  Clearly, Moustakas regards Husserl very highly, and I am now wondering if there is any way of escaping Husserl in Moustakas.  Personally, Husserl makes great sense to me aside from the concept of epoche or “the elimination of suppositions and the raising of knowledge above every possible doubt” (Moustakas, p. 26).  This epoche is otherwise known as bracketing (Madison, 2005).

According to Madison (2005), Heidegger disagreed with Husserl.  That is, while Husserl encouraged bracketing, Heidegger thought it was impossible or that “there is never a “pure” interpretation,” and I agree with this.  Actually, I think the concept of bracketing might undermine the legitimacy of phenomenology in the first place.  Phenomenology is concerned with the study of the subjective.  Consciousness builds schema upon schema or noetic factors and noemic meanings on top of each other.  There is no wiping subjectivity from the mind.

Yet, considering my issues with Husserl I am now unsure about my next course of action.  What would Heidegger do?  Would he just follow the methods outlined in Moustakas (1994) less any bracketing?  Recently, I was encouraged to obtain a copy of Van Manen’s phenomenology book, and I am hoping it will help.

Tonight I also looked over some material on visual ethnography (Pink, 2013).  While I cannot say I have visual ethnography “on the brain” or that I would make it central to my own work, I do not really see anything wrong with it.  Sure, there will be accusations of subjectivity, but I don’t think there is any method that can eliminate subjectivity.  Methods and interpretations are all constructs of the human mind, and they“help to produce the reality that they understand” (Law, 2004, p.5).     

Law, J. (2004). After method: Mess in social science research. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

Madison, S. D. (2005). Critical ethnography: Method, ethics, and performance. Thousand        Oaks, Sage.

Moustakas, C. (1994). Phenomenological research methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

          

Content Analysis

This week I read more in Grbich (2013), but my readings concerned content analysis of texts and visual documents.  Of greatest interest to me in these readings is ethnographic content analysis.  Apparently, this type of analysis employs a study of key words of documents within contexts to ascertain ideology.  A speech may be analyzed in this manner, as well as news reporting and various or other types of propaganda. Therefore, this all seems Noam Chomskyesque and had me, at least momentarily, contemplating this alternative method for an individual project. 

However, I think this form of analysis is likely more appropriate when one has very many documents to analyze or a few very long ones.  I am also not sure that enumerative analysis necessarily generates correct conclusions, since its focus is word count, though I think some broad assumptions may be made from it.  For instance, if worldle.net indicates the words elite and poor are most prominent in my dissertation, it is likely I have an interest in class issues.

As for content analysis of visual documents, I think its variations are useful but rather subjective.  However, I think the validity of visual analysis depends rather on the researcher’s specific purpose.  For example, I think research into common interpretation of images in structural analysis probably yields useful information.  I imagine the Rorschach inkblot test is based upon this type of research.  Yet, where Grbich (2013) was discussing iconology or inconography in the Mona Lisa and Guernica, I certainly often could not follow.  I also would have never noticed much of what was discussed.  Clearly, Da Vinci and Picasso had certain meanings in mind, but I might never know them.  I also make my own meaning.

Grbich, C. (2013). Qualitative data analysis: An introduction (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Phenomenological Analysis in Moustakas

This is my second post this week! ;)

In his chapter on analyses and examples Moustakas (1994) outlined a modification to the Van Kaam Method of Analysis and a modification to the Stevick-Colaizzi-Keen Method of Analysis.  Before I begin outlining my understanding and asking questions about it, I would like to give my own personal review of this section.  That is, I think this is a pretty good chapter.  However, I think it would have been better if Moustakas had demonstrated each step of the analysis with the same data.  I felt like some continuity was lost because he pulled from various data sets.  Also, had Moustakas stuck with the same data set, I would have read and understood more quickly and with less confusion.  With that said, though, I think I got the general gist of things with one major exception.

I did  flip back and two between pages 121 and 122 where the steps of the modified analyses were when I read through the chapter, and I admittedly followed the modified Van Kaam more because Moustakas (1994) provided more detail for that method.  I think this resulted in some confusion on my part, though, towards the end of the chapter during which I felt the textual and structural descriptions did not align exactly with the procedural outline.  Now, looking back at the Stevick-Colaizzi-Keen Method (SCKM), I think the chapter perhaps aligns better with this method.

The one thing that really bothers me, though, is the structural description.  As Moustakas (1994) stated, one should form an "Individual Structural Description of the experience based on the Individual Textual Description and Imaginative Variation" (p. 121). Then, according to what Moustakas said of the SCKM, one should "Reflect on your own textual description. Through imaginative variation, construct a description of the structures of your experience" (p. 122).  Are both methods saying that structural description is based on the researcher's experience with the interviewees?  Or is only SCKM doing this?  Also, when Moustakas clearly states of the SCKM "construct a description of the structures of your experience (p. 122)," does he mean the researcher's personal experience with the same type of experience or the researcher's interpretation of the experiences of the interviewee?  My interpretation of the actual examples Moustakas gave for the structural description step is that the researcher provides some sort of interpretive work, verging on psychoanalysis, of the interviewee.  Clearly, I remain really confused about the structural description bit.

Overall Steps, as I understand them now:

1) Record all statements of relevance to the experience being studied (horizons).
2) Get rid of duplicates and vague comments.
3) List all of what remains (invariant horizons).
4) Group these statements into theme categories.
5) Organize the themes with their statement to create a story of the individual's experience (textual description).
6) Construct a structural description from your own interpretation *
7) Construct a textual-structural description that blends 5 & 6.
8) One you have complete the above for all interviewees, construct the textual-structural description, which is a synthesis of the experiences of the textual-structural description (#7) of all interviees' experiences.

Moustakas, C. (1994). Phenomenological research methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.

Conversation Analysis

Today, I read the chapter on conversation analysis in Grbich (2013), as well as Rapley’s section on conversation analysis (2008, pp. 72-87).  As far as I can tell this form of analysis is less sequential than others.  Coding is not even typical (Grbich).  As Rapley, notes:

You can focus on a single episode of talk to explore in detail how that specific moment of interaction happens. You notice something interesting, something that you think might be an ‘organized way of talking. You then go and look for other examples, in other settings, between different speakers to see if you can find other examples of this type of work.  In this way, you attempt to build a case that this organized way of talking is something that people do as part of their everyday lives . . . (p. 77)

However, as in all the forms of qualitative analysis, the devil is in a form of detail, and in conversation analysis it is attention to speech acts.  Further, the purpose of this form of analysis is the study of social interactions, even down to pauses and stressed words, and it is accompanied by a detailed system of notation (Grbich). 

When reading this I thought of the ethnography my group is reading on teenagers, and how the author likens their social relationships to the social dynamics of the caste system (Milner, 2004).  It appears the author builds upon some conversations in his study of teens.

Grbich, C. (2013). Qualitative data analysis: An introduction (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA:

Sage.

Milner, M. (2004). Freaks, geeks, and cool kids: American teenagers, schools, and the culture of consumption. New York, NY: Routledge.

Rapley, T. (2007). Doing conversation discourse and document analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA:

Sage.

Thinking About Discourse Analysis

Over the past couple of days I have digested some information on discourse analysis.  The detail of this form of analysis is frightening. That is, I am not a detail oriented person, and I have some doubt when it comes to my ability to well carry out such an analysis.  Yet, I also appreciate this form of analysis much more than narrative analysis.

While I failed to see the potential of narrative analysis to yield much more additional information than other forms of analysis, what with recognizing and labeling parts in narratives likes climaxes and codas as in the study of great literary works, I feel that the detail imbedded in discourse analysis has potential to yield significant information to include, perhaps, otherwise overlooked information.  For as Gee (1999) highlights intonation, pause, formality of address, and word choice may all be significant, though “the purposes of the analyst [determine] how narrow or broad the transcript must be” (p. 88).  Thus, discourse may be very detailed, but to me it serves a practical purpose.

Furthermore, mention Foucault and Marx in association with a method of analysis, as Grbich (2013) does, and I am instantly more interested.  As Grbich notes, discourse analysis aims at uncovering “the rules, assumptions, ways of seeing, hidden motivations, conditions for development and change, and how and why these changes occurred or were resisted” (p. 246).  For instance, this form of analysis is very good for investigating why individuals support capitalism or another system, such as religion, as well as values and assumptions attributed to their perspectives.

While I find this method carries the burden of considerable detail (as previously noted), I would certainly find it compatible with critical theory.  I also think it could compliment a phenomenological method nicely.  After all, phenomenology studies experience, and this method of analysis investigates assumptions that shape the experience, as well as inflection or strength of feeling about experience.

Gee, J. P. (1999). An introduction to discourse analysis: Theory and method. NY: Routledge.

Grbich, C. (2013). Qualitative data analysis: An introduction (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks,  CA: Sage.